Terrorist Networks Project

Africa File, April 24, 2025: JNIM’s Growing Pressure on Benin; Turkey to Somalia; Salafi-Jihadi Cells Continue to Grow Across Nigeria

Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel carried out its deadliest-ever attack in Benin as it continues to increase the lethality of its operations in Benin throughout 2025. The latest attacks are significantly more lethal despite no increase in frequency.

Africa File, April 17, 2025: RSF War Crimes and Possible Genocide; al Shabaab Retaking Central Somalia; M23 Challenges; Algeria-Mali Spat

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has committed numerous war crimes as the group has intensified its efforts to consolidate control over western Sudan since losing Khartoum in March 2025.

Africa File, April 3, 2025: Russia-Sahel Summit; Sahelian Juntas Target Chinese Mining; M23 Loses Walikale But Uganda Leaves Vacuum in North Kivu

Russia is consolidating its strategic relationships with the Sahelian juntas to entrench itself in the region. The foreign ministers from the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov on April 3 and 4 as part of the first sessions of “AES-Russia consultations.” A joint AES statement announced that the meeting aims to establish strategic relations in areas of common interest.

Africa File, March 27, 2025: SAF Liberates Khartoum; Burundi and Rwanda Tensions

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fully retook central Khartoum and are clearing the last pockets of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) resistance from the greater Khartoum area, marking a major military and political victory for the SAF. Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and other foreign actors have sent weapons to the SAF and RSF that both sides are using in the battle for Khartoum. The RSF has intensified its efforts to defeat the SAF in western Sudan as it loses Khartoum to consolidate control over the western half of the country and enforce a de facto partition.

Africa File, March 13, 2025: Looming Civil Wars in Ethiopia, South Sudan Threaten to Plunge Horn into Crisis; Renewed Peace Talks in DRC as M23 Advances

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains unlikely to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s maximalist negotiating demands despite nominally conceding to Angolan-mediated direct talks with M23. The DRC, M23, and Rwanda may be open to short-term ceasefires as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. M23 has continued to advance in several areas of eastern DRC since the beginning of March.

Africa File Special Edition: Tigray Threatens to Spark the Next Eritrean-Ethiopian War and Plunge the Horn of Africa into Crisis

A violent power struggle in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia, which could, in turn, expand quickly to include Eritrea. Renewed conflict in Tigray or between Ethiopia and Eritrea would generate an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis that would have reverberations across Africa and even into Europe.

Africa File, February 27, 2025: SAF Advances West Toward Darfur; M23 and DRC Reset as International Pressure Grows on Rwanda; ISSP Poses Clear Transnational Threat; al Shabaab Central Somalia Offensive

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are advancing in south-central Sudan and setting conditions for an offensive into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur. The SAF captured el Obeid—a state capital in south-central Sudan that will likely support SAF offensives into Rapid Support Forces (RSF) strongholds in Darfur—on February 20.

Africa File, February 20, 2025: M23 Advance Continues Unchallenged; SAF Grows Partnerships with Iran and Russia; RSF Creates Parallel Government in Sudan

Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 captured the South Kivu provincial capital, Bukavu, and continued to advance on several axes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23’s advances have set conditions for the group to expand its campaign into the interior of the DRC by strengthening its supply lines with Rwanda and securing access to roads that connect to adjacent regions of the DRC. M23’s control of Bukavu and Lake Kivu also gives M23 and Rwanda significant economic benefits.

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