Iran Update, August 15, 2023

Iran Update, August 15, 2023

Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Ashka Jahveri, Johanna Moore

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched an interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran and the Syrian regime shifted their state-run information operation from the false claim that US forces will imminently attack Syrian-regime controlled territory and are instead alleging that United States supported recent ISIS attacks. Axis of Resistance media, however, continue to falsely accuse the United States of preparing to attack Syrian-regime controlled territory.
2. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Shia Coordination Framework leadership in Baghdad on August 15. Ghaani’s stop in Baghdad was the latest in a series of meetings with members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.
3. Iranian state media signaled the regime’s frustration with the Taliban on the two-year anniversary of the group’s takeover of Afghanistan. This is a change from the conciliatory tone Iranian officials have recently adopted toward the Taliban.
4. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi appointed Qom Provincial Governor Mohammad Taghi Shah Cheraghi as Interior Ministry Political Deputy and head of Iran’s Election Headquarters on August 15. Shah Cheraghi could play a role in formulating the regime’s responses to anticipated security threats in the coming months.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iran and the Syrian regime shifted their state-run information operation from the false claim that US forces will imminently attack Syrian-regime controlled territory and are instead alleging that United States supported recent ISIS attacks.  Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are coordinating an information operation that falsely claimed their deployments to Deir ez Zor were to protect against a US-SDF attack into regime-controlled territory, as ISW and CTP previously reported.^[1] Iranian and Syrian state media had stopped messaging this claim by August 9 and are instead now accusing the United States of supporting ISIS in recent attacks.^[2] Axis of Resistance media, however, continue to falsely accuse the United States of preparing to attack Syrian-regime controlled territory.

• Iranian state news outlet Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency (IRNA) accused the United States of creating ISIS on August 14.^[3] Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani incorrectly alluded to US support for ISIS on August 15 in saying that ISIS attacks have increased in Syria because ISIS receives intelligence, security and logistical support from the United States.^[4]

• Syrian-regime affiliated Athr Press reported on August 10 that the US Al Tanf garrison in southeastern Syria is the central point of a heightened military presence.^[5] The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the United States on August 12 of supporting an ISIS attack on Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 17th Division forces in the Mayadin desert which resulted in over 40 causalities.^[6] The Syrian Defense Minister also blamed the United States for supporting terrorism on August 15 in a speech at the Moscow Conference on International Security.^[7]
• Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media al Mayadeen said on August 9 that US reinforcements to eastern Syria are to launch an attack on Albu Kamal.[8] Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah blamed the United States for ordering recent ISIS attacks in Syria, Iran, and Pakistan in a speech on August 14.[9]

The shift in Iranian and Syrian-regime messaging is consistent with Iranian, Russian, and Syrian regime allegations over the last several years that the United States created, trained, and has funded ISIS.^[10] The spread of complementary narratives of US aggression in eastern Syria furthers Iran’s goal of creating a grassroots resistance to US forces in eastern Syria.^[11]

CTP previously reported that an Iranian-backed militia—named the Popular Resistance in the Eastern Region—claimed to attack US forces at three separate bases in eastern Syria on August 12.^[12] The group’s claim has failed to gain traction in eastern Syria even though Syrian regime-affiliated sources have circulated false statements since late June that the United States and allied forces in Syria intend to launch an offensive to retake regime-held towns.^[13] CTP has not observed Iranian, Russian, Syrian state affiliated media recirculate the claim. The information space in Syria remains hostile to the United States, however, as Iranian proxy media outlets continue to frame US forces as an imminent threat to locals.^[14]

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Shia Coordination Framework leadership in Baghdad on August 15.[15] Ghaani met with Framework leadership to discuss the US-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue that took place on August 7-8 and provincial elections scheduled for December 2023, according to a report from the independent Iraqi news agency Shafaq.[16] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loosely aligned political coalition of pro-Iranian parties.[17] Ghaani may have also discussed Axis operations in the region and/or recent IED attacks that the Iraqi Shia militia Ashab al Kahf conducted. Ghaani commonly meets with the leaders of Iranian-backed militias, some of whom are a members of the Framework, during his trips to Baghdad. Ghaani. Ashab al Kahf has consistently been the most publicly aggressive of the Iranian-backed militias in recent months.[18]

Ghaani’s stop in Baghdad was the latest in a series of meetings with members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Ghaani first traveled to Syria around August 3 to review Iranian forces deployed in Deir ez Zor Province.[19]  He then met with Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on August 6 in Beirut.[20] CTP presented three possible issues Ghaani and Nasrallah may have discussed including LH forces deployed to eastern Syria, Lebanese domestic and border-related issues, and/or arming militants in the West Bank.[21]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iranian state media signaled the regime’s frustration with the Taliban on the two-year anniversary of the group’s takeover of Afghanistan, which is a change from the conciliatory tone Iranian officials have recently adopted toward the Taliban. Iranian Ambassador to Afghanistan Hassan Kazemi Ghomi on August 10 blamed the United States for permitting the Islamic State’s presence to grow inside Afghanistan and for instability in the country.[22] Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) then criticized the Taliban on August 15, the two-year anniversary of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. IRNA maligned the Taliban for its inability to meet the security demands of neighboring states, such as Iran, that have repeatedly expressed concerned over the Islamic State gaining strength inside Afghanistan.[23] IRNA also criticized the Taliban for refusing Iran access to water from the Helmand River.

Iranian officials have frequently stated the above grievances over the past two years without receiving any redress from the Taliban. The regime has frequently pressured the Taliban to adopt stronger counterterrorism measures and has held numerous meetings with neighboring countries in recent months to discuss security concerns emanating from Afghanistan.[24] Iranian officials have not explicitly linked the August 13 attack on the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz to Afghanistan. Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Fada Hossein Maleki stated on August 14 that Iranian security services are identifying Afghan migrants in Iran with the “potential” to join the Islamic State, however.[25] The August 13 attack nevertheless compounds the existing Iranian grievances toward the Taliban. Tensions over water rights also reached a high point in May 2023, with Iranian and Afghan border guards engaging in a brief and lethal clash near the Milak-Zaranj border.[26] The confluence of security threats facing Iran places the regime in a difficult position as it attempts to balance its fragile relationship with the Taliban while simultaneously ensuring domestic stability. 

Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi appointed Qom Provincial Governor Mohammad Taghi Shah Cheraghi as Interior Ministry Political Deputy and head of Iran’s Election Headquarters on August 15.[27] The Interior Ministry Political Deputy is responsible for organizing elections, issuing protest licenses, and proposing governor candidates to the Interior Minister and Government Cabinet.[28]  Shah Cheraghi is a former IRGC provincial corps commander and has familial connections to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[29] CTP previously assessed that the Iranian regime tolerated the November 2022-May 2023 coordinated campaign to poison Iranian school girls, which was largely concentrated in Qom Province.[30] Shah Cheraghi was slow to respond to the crisis, only making his first public statement about the student poisonings on February 16, after more than 30 incidents had already occurred.[31]  The first reported poisoning incident occurred in Qom on November 30.[32] Shah Cheraghi is additionally a strong advocate of the mandatory hijab and previously called for adopting “negative measures” against unveiled women.[33] It is unclear what Shah Cheraghi meant when using this term, however. The United States has not sanctioned Shah Cheraghi for his role in repressing women in Iran.

Shah Cheraghi could play a role in formulating the regime’s responses to anticipated security threats in the coming months. Interior Ministry officials have voiced concerns about various security threats in recent months.[34] Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated on June 5 that Iran’s enemies are attempting to disrupt the March 2024 parliamentary elections, for example.[35] The Interior Ministry is additionally concerned about Iranian women flouting the mandatory hijab law. The Law Enforcement Command (LEC), which operates under the Interior Ministry, resumed the country-wide deployment of its morality patrol officers to enforce mandatory veiling on July 16.[36] Iranians are planning protests to commemorate the LEC‘s killing of Mahsa Amini on September 16, 2022.[37] CTP reported on August 2 that Iranian leaders are discussing expanding the Basij, suppressing dissent in universities, and monitoring cyberspace to more effectively confront social unrest.[38]