Iran Project

Iran Update, July 18, 2023

1. Russia accused the United States of preparing false flag chemical weapons attacks against Syria, possibly supporting the joint Russian-Syrian-Iranian pressure campaign to expel US forces from the country.
2. Hamas’ militant wing in Jenin ambushed an Israeli military vehicle with a Shawath-1 explosively formed penetrator (EFP) during the Jenin raid on July 3, leading to the injury of seven Israeli soldiers. The Axis of Resistance likely aims to raise the costs of Israeli ground operations in the West Bank through the proliferation of EFPs.
3. Iran is pursuing a tit-for-tat policy with respect to seizing commercial tankers in the Persian Gulf.
4. Iranian Economic and Financial Affairs Minister Ehsan Khandouzi traveled to Beijing, China to attend the first Iran-China Joint Cooperation Commission meeting on July 16.

Iran Update, July 17, 2023

A US senior defense official said Iran, Russia, and Syria are cooperating to pressure the US to withdraw forces from Syria. This is consistent with CTP’s assessment that Iran’s military buildup in eastern Syria may be to achieve hegemony.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al Sudani met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus on July 16 to discuss economic, security, and normalization issues. The improvement of Iraqi-Syrian relations through joint economic integration projects very likely would enable Iran to exploit regional trade to improve its economy and bolster Iranian regional influence.

Senior Iranian and Pakistani military officials met in Tehran between July 15 and 17. The meetings likely regard the volatile security situation in southeastern Iran, where Jaish al Adl conducted an attack on July 8.

Israel-based i24News claimed on July 16 that Armenia has used Iranian Shahed drones in several recent clashes with Azerbaijan. Iran may expand its military support to Armenia in response to Russian “negligence” toward the Caucasus.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) resumed the country-wide deployment of its morality patrol officers to enforce mandatory veiling on July 16.

Iran Update, July 14, 2023

Iranian-backed militias raised salaries for standard militia members in Mayadin and Albu Kamal Cities, Deir ez Zor Province by 13 percent on July 13, likely enabling Iran to maintain a competitive advantage in recruitment amid increasing troop deployments to the province.

Popular Mobilization Force (PMF)-affiliated social media accounts that circulated calls to storm the US Embassy on July 14 prompted two small demonstrations of Ashab al Kahf protesters in the Jadiriyah District and al Kahdra neighborhood of Baghdad.

President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe between July 12-14 as part of his administration’s intensifying economic diplomacy efforts.

Senior security and foreign policy officials are articulating the regime’s comprehensive perspective on threats emanating from the Caucasus.

Iran Update, July 12, 2023

Iranian-backed militias are continuing to reinforce their positions in Deir ez Zor Province, possibly to bolster defensive positions against a rumored International Coalition attack.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani announced the Iraqi government will evade US sanctions on Iran by trading Iraqi crude oil for Iranian gas during a televised statement on July 11.

Social media accounts affiliated with the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces called for supporters to siege the US Embassy in Baghdad, which could elevate the risk of an attack on US personnel in Iraq.

Iranian officials and media responded negatively to the July 10 Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint statement, highlighting preexisting tensions in the Russo-Iranian relationship.

The Raisi administration is attempting to override parliamentary adjustments to its mandatory veiling bill. Regime enforcement of mandatory veiling—in any capacity—will likely exacerbate intra-regime tensions. It will also likely reignite anti-regime sentiments.

Iran Update, July 11, 2023

Iranian-backed militias and Syrian regime forces are continuing to reinforce their positions in Deir ez Zor Province in response to rumors of an imminent International Coalition attack to liberate cities
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The Shia Coordination Framework – a loosely aligned coalition of pro-Iranian political parties – blamed US sanctions on Iranian accounts in Iraq for failures in energy supply to Iraq from Iran, likely to place additional political pressure on the Iraqi government to remove the US from Iraq.

Social media accounts affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) circulated a call on July 11 for supporters to storm the US Embassy in Baghdad.

Iran is attempting to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt to portray itself as a member of the global community. Normalizing ties with Egypt would likely improve Iran’s economy.

Iranian security personnel violently suppressed injured Iraq-Iran war veterans protesting livelihood conditions in front of the Martyr Affairs Foundation Headquarters in Tehran on July 8..

Iran Update, July 10, 2023

Iranian-backed militias and Syrian regime forces deployed to Deir ez Zor in response to rumors of an imminent International Coalition attack to liberate cities there which began in late June.

Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian-regime media outlets claimed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will pressure Turkey to withdraw its forces from Syria in exchange for direct investment. Iran and Syria may aim to use the media outlets to shape negotiations ahead of talks between Turkey and the Gulf States about Syrian-Turkish normalization.

Four Jaish al Adl militants attacked a police station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 8 in retaliation for the September 2022 “Blood Friday” massacre, indicating that Jaish al Adl is trying to portray itself as the bastion of Iranian Baloch citizens. The Iranian regime limited its response to condemning the attack, likely to maintain stability in this restive border region.

IRGC-affiliated media is touting the successes of Iran-sponsored armed resistance in the West Bank against the recent Israeli raids into the area.

President Ebrahim Raisi will visit Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on July 11 to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa, marking the first Iranian presidential visit to Africa in 11 years. Greater economic cooperation with African countries will not enable the Iranian regime to fix the structural flaws in Iran’s economy, however.

Iran Update, July 6, 2023

Iran bolstered Lebanese Hezbollah’s (LH’s) air defense capabilities likely to establish a deterrent in Lebanon against Israel.

Palestinian militant groups called for a cohesive strategy to counter Israel and may expand their joint military operation against Israel.

Iranian diaspora media, citing Russian investigative sources, claimed on July 6 that Russia has paid Iran nearly 900 million US dollars for Iranian drone technology.

Iran Update, July 5, 2023

Palestinian militants thanked Iran and the broader Axis of Resistance for their help during the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid in Jenin and likely will receive Iranian assistance to rebuild the military capabilities the IDF degraded.
Iranian officials inflated the amount of Iranian funds that a recent US sanctions waiver for Iraq will provide, possibly to inspire confidence in Iran’s economy and currency. News of similar waivers for Iraq has coincided with short-term improvements for the Iranian economy.

Iran became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on July 4, which may enable it to circumvent sanctions through non-US dollar financial transactions with other SCO countries. Iran could benefit militarily from its membership in the SCO through participation in counterterrorism and naval exercises.

Iran attempted to seize two US oil tankers in the Strait on July 5, likely to assert its control over the Strait of Hormuz given the recent US naval deployments to the Persian Gulf. Iran also likely sought to pressure the US to accede to Iran’s demands in the nuclear negotiations.

Iran Update, June 30, 2023

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) established a headquarters in eastern Syria, probably to coordinate arms transfers, intelligence collection, and training for Iranian-backed militants in Syria.

The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian forces conducted air strikes on rebel groups in Idlib Province shortly after the failure of the latest normalization and Astana Talks, and Iran may send Iranian-backed militants to in northwestern Syria to support the pro-regime operations.

Iran's worsening water crisis is increasing food insecurity and internal migration, which will likely fuel greater popular unrest in the coming years.

Iran Update, June 29, 2023

The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian forces conducted airstrikes on rebel positions in Idlib Province between June 25 and 27. The head of the Russian Reconciliation Center, which is affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense in Syria, said the strikes responded to militants in Idlib Province that launched drone strikes into Syrian regime-held territory on June 22 and 23. He said on June 29 that the airstrikes will continue until the “elimination of militants.” The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights noted that the airstrikes are the deadliest in 2023 and resulted in at least 22 casualties. Hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and militants relocated to Idlib Province during the Syrian civil war, which makes it the last rebel stronghold in Syria. The US-designated terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham established an Islamist government in Idlib Province in 2017. Russia and Turkey agreed to a series of de-escalation agreements in 2017 and 2018 to stall a broader Turkish military incursion into Idlib Province. However, Russian forces and Iranian-backed militants supported the Syrian President Bashar al Assad regime in launching an offensive to retake Idlib Province in 2019, which concluded in a ceasefire agreement in 2020. Since the ceasefire, Russian forces have conducted several airstrikes on rebel positions which rarely resulted in further escalation.

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