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1. Iran and Iranian-backed militias facilitated the travel of Iranian religious pilgrims into Syria, possibly to expand Iranian influence in Syria.
2. Anti-regime protests organized by Iranian university students have increased in recent weeks, demonstrating the regime’s failure to suppress a key demographic of the Mahsa Amini movement.
Syrian state media released the final communique of the Arab League Summit in Jeddah on May 19, which highlighted Arab state unity and uncharacteristically rejected external support for non-state militias. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani expressed dissatisfaction with the resolution. Bashar al Assad met with Saudi and Emirati leaders in Jeddah to strengthen economic and bilateral ties, demonstrating Assad’s increased opportunities for economic engagement with neighboring countries. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have not indicated willingness or capacity to collaborate militarily with Syria, leaving Iran as one of Assad’s key security partners. Saudi Arabia normalized relations with Iran on March 10 and the United Arab Emirates is funding key infrastructure projects in Iran, demonstrating Arab League states’ mixed policy toward Iran.
The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are consolidating their footprint in northern Iraq, which will likely increase the risk of sectarian conflict there. A PMF footprint could help Iran secure a new arms shipment route into Syria.
The IRGC Navy conducted unprofessional and unsafe maneuvers near a US naval ship in the Persian Gulf, which risks accidental collisions and miscalculations.
Anti-regime protests have flared up in Iran in response to increased state executions, demonstrating that many protesters remain undeterred from further protest despite the brutal regime crackdown during the Mahsa Amini movement.
Iran is trying to expand its economic cooperation, especially energy ties, with Syria to reinforce Iranian influence over Damascus, as Assad pursues improved ties with the Arab states. Deepening Iranian economic influence in Syria will help Iranian leaders revitalize their own economy, especially if Arab states begin to send investment and reconstruction funds to Syria.
The Raisi administration issued veiled threats toward the Afghan Taliban, calling on the group to release more water from the Helmand River from Afghanistan into Iran. The Raisi administration is likely concerned that water shortages in the coming summer months could fuel protests across the country, especially in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to attack US forces in Iraq, likely elevating the risk of an attack on US or Coalition forces. The militias were responding to a statement from US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowsi about US plans to stay in the Middle East and invest in diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation on May 15. Iraqi proxy façade group Ashab al Kaf and suspected proxy façade group Tuthia al Shiyea posted separate calls for attacks on US forces to expel them from Iraq. Tuthia al Shiyea rejected any negotiation with the United States and threatened armed resistance. Ashab al Kaf warned that it will target US forces in addition to Iraqis working for American intelligence services, but also called on Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to expel US forces from Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias gain a significant amount of their legitimacy from opposing the US presence in Iraq and responding to instances of American or Iraqi officials commenting on a continued US presence in Iraq. The militias do not always follow through with their threats to attack US forces, however.
Iran is taking steps to improve operational security for convoys traveling into Syria from Iraq, likely to protect arms transfers from Israeli airstrikes. Iran also is stoking conflict between Israel and Palestinian militias, likely to enable the IRGC to transfer military equipment into Syria with less risk of Israeli interdiction.
Russia is pursuing mutually beneficial economic and military programs with Iran, very likely to ensure Iran continues to provide material support for Russian operations in Ukraine. Iran’s acquisition of Russian Su-35s through those deals may enable Tehran to more readily and independently project power in the coming years.
Iranian leaders are stoking conflict between Israel and Palestinian militias, likely to enable the IRGC to transfer military equipment into Syria with a lower risk of Israeli interdiction. Iranian weapon shipments into Syria could trigger a new escalation cycle with Israel that risks entangling US and Coalition forces.
Ultra-hardline political factions are mounting a political campaign against pragmatic hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, likely to restrain him from pursuing major political reforms. Ghalibaf has been calling for major political and economic reforms for several months.
The Iranian regime is portraying clerics as allies of the Iranian people likely to prevent further acts of violence against them. Unspecified individuals attacked clerics on five separate occasions in April and May 2023, marking a five-fold increase in attacks against religious figures compared to the first three months of 2023.
Iran is maneuvering to economically benefit from Syria’s reintegration into the region, which may enable Iran to circumvent US and international sanctions, as well as support Iranian-backed militias operating in Syria. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed 15 cooperative agreements with Syria on May 3 in a push to be the primary provider of reconstruction projects in Syria. CTP previously assessed that Iran may use the Iranian para-statal organization Khatam al Anbia or Iranian-backed proxy companies to oversee such reconstruction projects. Iranian Free Trade, Industrial, and Special Economic Zones Supreme Council Secretary Hojatollah Abdol Maleki stated on May 6 that plans to establish a free trade zone between Iran, Iraq, and Syria have entered a “technical and implementation stage.” Maleki suggested the free trade zone may extend to the Latakia port and the Al Qaim Iraq-Syria border crossing. A free trade zone through Syria, Iraq, and Iran would allow Iran to move materiel across borders without oversight that would normally enforce sanctions on trade with Syria and Iran. The Arab League voted on May 7 to readmit Syria, after which an unidentified Jordanian official claimed that the Arab League will lobby to lift Western sanctions on Syria if the Assad regime agrees to a political solution to end the crisis. The end of sanctions on Syria with the establishment of a free trade zone and Iranian reconstruction projects would enable Iran to circumvent Western sanctions on Iran.
Iran Update, May 5, 2023
Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick
May 5, 2023, 4:00 pm ET
The Iranian regime is seeking to take advantage of political and economic developments in Syria and Iraq to improve the Iranian economy and advance its strategic goals in the region. Various Raisi administration ministers met with Syrian officials on May 4. Economic and Financial Affairs Minister Ehsan Khandouzi announced the “removal of obstacles” to Iranian export companies operating in Syria following a meeting with several Syrian economic officials. Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zare Pour separately signed a cooperation agreement with his Syrian counterpart, Iyad al Khatib, to facilitate Iranian involvement in modernizing Syria’s telecommunications infrastructure. Zare Pour additionally emphasized Iranian satellites’ ability to produce high-resolution images that Syrian officials can use in agriculture, infrastructure, and construction. Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani and Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash also accompanied Raisi to Damascus. Ashtiani likely sought to secure weapons sales while Bazrpash likely discussed plans with Syrian officials to establish a rail link between Iran and Syria.